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Corporate governance has attracted many researchers to examine the relationship 
between board characteristics and financial performance. This study aims to determine 
the effect of board diversity, board size, and board independence on financial 
performance. This research is panel data with the number of observations reaching 
1,355 years of observation. Financial performance is measured using accounting-based 
and market-based. It was found that the presence of female directors could not provide 
sound financial performance, even with a woman's prudence attitude would have an 
impact on decreasing the company's market value. The size of the board of directors 
does not affect financial performance, and the large size of the board of directors will 
have an impact on the decline in firm value. Independent directors are also not proven 
to be able to improve the company's financial performance; even the tendency of 
companies to carelessly fulfill the provisions of the rules regarding the existence of 
independent directors will bring a burden to the company so that it has an impact on 
the decline in company value. 
Keywords: board diversity, board size, board independent, financial performance. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance has a significant impact on the economy because good 
governance can ensure returns to investors by minimizing the associated investment 
risks and contributing to company performance (Murhadi et al., 2018; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). The board of directors plays a fundamental role in strengthening 
corporate governance through an essential role in monitoring and advising on resource 
provision (Ntim et al., 2015). Corporate governance has attracted many studies to 
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examine the relationship between board characteristics and financial performance. The 
board of directors, an essential mechanism in a company, has responsibility for 
oversight and protecting the interests of the company's shareholders. These functions 
make the board of directors one of the essential internal corporate governance control 
mechanisms in an entity (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008). 
On a global scale, women's representation on boards of directors and management 
teams is still limited. External pressure on companies to include women on boards 
comes from social groups, shareholders, and policymakers. Gender diversity is 
considered a strategic corporate issue and affects corporate governance practices 
(Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Francoeur et al., 2008). The presence of women 
can increase the effectiveness of the board of directors. Gender diversity on the board 
of directors is a topic of increasing scientific and policy-making interest (Lagos Cortés 
et al., 2018). The representation of women at the top of the corporate hierarchy has an 
essential impact on business performance. Gender diversity itself can expand the range 
of experience and expertise and the human resources available to a team (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009). The privilege of women's participation on the board of directors of 
companies, especially in developing countries, can make a more substantial 
contribution to cognitive variation for improving business performance. (Palaniappan, 
2017).  
Gender diversity is positively related to business performance. Women with 
characteristics who are more careful and details will be considered able to reduce the 
aggressiveness of men on the board of directors. Gender diversity will impact 
companies that are more controlled and cautious in carrying out risky expansions. With 
more control of the company, the profitability performance is also getting better 
(Abdullah et al., 2016; Assenga et al., 2018; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2019; Lagos Cortés et al., 
2018). This more controlled company is also following the resource dependence 
theory; women on board can convince stakeholders about its diversity, increase its 
legitimacy, and connect with the external environment (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). 
Meanwhile, there is a growing perception that women with soft and emotional 
characteristics can make surveillance ineffective. The dominance of men in the world 
of work creates a gender bias so that not many women can reach positions on the board 
of directors. The presence of women is not effective in improving company 
performance as measured by using ROA. The reasons are that first, the presence of 
women is only a complementary role in corporate governance. Second, the law 
regarding gender diversity is still minimal. Women are also considered to be emotional, 
aggressive, risk-averse, and insecure (Lagos Cortés et al., 2018) 
This study also examines the effect of board size and board independence on 
financial performance. Small board size can coordinate and communicate better than a 
large board size because information flows more easily. Smaller board sizes also have 
the advantage of lower costs and faster decision-making processes. This smaller board 
size is more efficient in increasing financial performance (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2019; Koji 
et al., 2020). However, another opinion states that with larger body sizes, there can be 
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synergies and increased supervision to impact better performance (Assenga et al., 2018; 
Lagos Cortés et al., 2018). 
An independent board is an independent and is not bound to shareholders or 
executives. With independent status, they will be more neutral (Bhagat & Bolton, 2019; 
Lagos Cortés et al., 2018; Malik & Makhdoom, 2016; Tricker, 2012) Supporters of 
agency theory argue that most independent boards can effectively monitor company 
executives to minimize agency costs (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jackling & Johl, 2009). 
While different opinions state that even though it is called board independence, it is not 
fully independent in practice, so the existence of board independence does not 
contribute to performance. Board independence and oversight becomes ineffective 
(Assenga et al., 2018; Ferrer & Banderlipe II, 2012; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Kılıç & 
Kuzey, 2019). Consistent with Fulgence (2014) argues that some directors may not be 
completely independent in Tanzania because selecting and appointing an independent 
board is not entirely transparent. 
From the explanation above, this research will examine gender diversity, the board 
size, and board independence on financial performance in Indonesia. This study also 
uses control variables in the form of Firm Size and Leverage. The larger the size of the 
company, the lower the company's financial performance. The larger the firm size, the 
greater the total assets of the company. However, some companies have significant 
assets but cannot use them to the maximum in generating profits. Significant total assets 
also indicate that many assets are unemployed so that the profit received is less than 
the maximum (Assenga et al., 2018; Lagos Cortés et al., 2018). The larger the firm size 
has a significantly positive effect on the return on assets. Large companies will receive 
more attention, so the board of directors and directors will work harder in conducting 
supervision and management activities. So the size of the company is expected to 
provide added value for increasing the company's financial performance (The effect of 
company size on profitability is because the larger the size of the company, the higher 
the total assets and operating income of the company and will increase profitability as 
measured by the company's ROA (Bhatt & Bhattacharya, 2015; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2019). 
Leverage is measured as a percentage of the book value of total debt to total assets, 
determining the company's specific risk. That is, the higher the leverage, the closer the 
company is to bankruptcy risk. The level of bankruptcy costs is associated with a high 
level of debt. Thus, a negative association occurs between leverage and firm 
performance (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2019; Lagos Cortés et al., 2018)  
  
RESEARCH METHODS 
This study is all non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(IDX). Measurement of financial performance as the dependent variable in this study 
is proxied using return on assets (ROA) and firm value (Tobin's Q). In Indonesia, the 
Board of directors whose function is to supervise management is better known as the 
Board of Commissioners. For the independent variable, gender diversity is measured 
by the percentage of women in the board of directors (woman), board size is measured 
by the number of boards of directors (Bsize), and board independence is measured by 
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the percentage of independent directors in the board of directors (B_Ind). The control 
variable of firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (Fsize), while 
the debt ratio measures debt (Lev). The data used is panel data with multiple linear 
regression analysis techniques. The sample criteria used are companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange for five consecutive years and have audited financial and 
annual reports, and all data is available as needed for all variables during the 2015-
2019 period.  
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
This study uses 271 companies, with the number of observations reaching 1,355 years 
of observation. Multicollinearity test was conducted with the results in table 1, where 




 Woman BSIZE B_IND FSIZE LEV 
Woman  1.000000 -0.127456 -0.025950 -0.132954 -0.022597 
BSIZE -0.127456 1.000000 -0.091527 0.480023 0.115402 
B_IND -0.025950 -0.091527 1.000000 0.084573 0.175411 
FSIZE -0.132954 0.480023 0.084573 1.00000 0.283004 
LEV -0.022597 0.115402 0.175411 0.283004 1.00000 
 
Tests on the Chow test are presented in table 2. The Chow test shows significant results 




Effects Test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Model 1 with ROA as dependent variable  
Cross-section F 8.729871 (270,1079) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 1569.476511 270 0.0000 
Model 2 with Tobisn Q as dependent variable 
Cross-section F 20.549512 (270,1079) 0.0000 
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Table 3 shows the Haussman test results for both models, where all the results are 




Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Model 1 with ROA as dependent variable 
Cross-section random 11.996130 5 0.0348 
Model 2 with Tobisn Q as dependent variable 
Cross-section random 13.140046 5 0.0221 
 
In table 4, for the dependent variable ROA, it is found that diversity on the board 
or women in the board of directors does not affect the return on assets (ROA). This 
result is because women on the board of directors are considered ineffective in 
improving company performance. The first reason is that the existence of women is 
only a complementary role in governance. The second is if the law regarding the 
existence of gender in the directors is still minimal. Francoeur et al. (2008) confirmed 
that the presence of women in the business is explicitly only to improve company 





Variable ROA Tobins Q 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
C -0.162 -1.96** 6.995 20.51*** 
Woman 0.000 0.13 -0.208 -9.01*** 
BSIZE -0.000 -0.12 -0.008 -1.89* 
B.IND -0.005 -1.81* -0.126 -3.36*** 
FSIZE 0.009 3.19*** -0.187 -15.62*** 
LEV -0.126 -24.18*** 0.382 11.09*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.925879 0.952520 
F-statistic 62.50366 99.77542 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00000 0.00000 
Note: ***significant at α 1%; **significant at α 5%; *significant at α 10%; 
 
In the second model, it was found that the results of women in the board of 
directors had a significant adverse effect on Tobin's Q (TQ). This negative effect is in 
line with research conducted by Ferreira (2010), which found that women on the board 
of directors have a negative influence on company performance when there are not 
enough qualified women for top management positions. Darmadi (2013) also found 
that the presence of women in directors has a negative effect; this is due to the condition 
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of companies registered in Indonesia being family companies where most of the 
companies will be controlled by families. In addition, the presence of women in the 
composition of the directors is more likely to be related to family relationships 
compared to the actual competence possessed. Having women on the board allows for 
increased internal conflict due to different risks. 
The size of the board of directors from table 3 is also found not to affect the return 
on assets (ROA). This result is because the board members lack skills and expertise, 
which causes the board of directors to be ineffective in supervising management. Thus, 
the size of the board of directors cannot guarantee financial performance. The board of 
directors' size in the company is not a determining factor that can improve company 
performance. Instead, it is seen how the Board of Directors works effectively. The 
second model found that the size of the board of directors had a non-significant 
negative effect on Tobin's Q (TQ). This result is because there are members of the 
board of directors who lack skills and expertise, causing ineffective management 
supervision. It can be concluded that the size of the board of directors is not a 
determining factor that can improve company performance but how effective the board 
of directors is in monitoring and supervising management which will have an impact 
on improving performance (Topal & Dogan, 2014).  
For the independent commissioner variable on ROA, significant negative results 
were found at the level of 10%. This result means that the existence of an independent 
commissioner gives a negative result which means a decrease in ROA performance. 
This result can be understood by independent directors whose selection process is not 
carried out openly, which impacts the selection of independent directors who tend only 
to fulfill obligations. At the same time, the existence of an independent commissioner 
will incur costs for the company. This independent board has an impact on the 
company's burden of increasing so that performance decreases. The second model 
found that the independent commissioner has a significant negative effect on Tobin's 
Q. This study indicates that the independent commissioner has not managed 
management effectively, reducing company performance. Independent directors who 
do not have experience and knowledge of the company's objectives also impact the 
company's expenses which are increasing compared to the benefits derived from the 
existence of independent directors. This study is also supported by Bhagat & Bolton 
(2019), who found that independent directors have a negative influence on company 
performance, this is because if a company has a small proportion of independent 
directors, it can carry out adequate supervision of management which causes company 
performance to increase. 
Table 3 for the control variable company size shows that the results have a 
significant positive effect on ROA. A large company size makes companies gain 
economies of scale in operations so that costs are relatively cheaper than companies 
with smaller sizes (Gunawan et al., 2019). In addition, the larger the size of the 
company, the public will trust it more so that it is easier for the company to market the 
product. These results can affect the company's profitability; the more significant the 
company's size will significantly influence profitability and company value. In 
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addition, a large company size can increase product differentiation, and lower 
production costs will improve company performance (Kulic and Kuzey, 2016). 
However, the company size variable was found to have a significant adverse effect on 
Tobin's Q. This negative effect is because if the company's size gets large, it will require 
tighter supervision while the smaller company size will be easier to grow to increase 
its value. In addition, investors assess that the larger the size of the company, the greater 
the risk faced by the company. Larger companies also tend to have many problems 
compared to small companies; this can decrease company performance, thus affecting 
investors' views on the company. (Bhat and Bhattacharya, 2015).  
For the control variable, leverage was found to have a significant adverse effect 
on ROA. This negative effect can be explained if a company has a high level of debt; 
it will cause the debt burden to be paid to be higher so that the company is getting 
closer to the risk of bankruptcy Gunawan et al. (2019). Companies that use a debt 
proportion that is too high can cause the lender to carry out strict supervision of the 
company. This strict supervision has an impact that management is limited to carrying 
out company operational activities so that it has an impact on reducing company 
performance (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2019; Moreno-Gómez et al., 2018; Sheikh & Wang, 
2013). However, in table 3, it is also found that the results of the leverage variable have 
a significant positive effect on Tobin's Q. This result can be interpreted if the higher 
the levels of leverage, the higher the value of Tobin's Q. Companies that use more 
significant debt mean that the company is confident in its ability to settle debt 
obligations. This argument follows the signaling theory, where the announcement of 
the company getting debt will be responded to by an increase in the company's stock 
price. It can be understood that a company that obtains debt means that in the eyes of 
creditors, the company has sufficient financial capacity to meet all obligations to 
creditors (Dwidjaja et al., 2017).  
 
CONCLUSION  
Based on the study results, it was found that the presence of female directors cannot 
provide sound financial performance; even a woman's prudence will have an impact on 
the decline in the company's market value. The size of the board of directors does not 
affect financial performance, and the large size of the board of directors will have an 
impact on the decline in firm value. Independent directors are also not proven to be 
able to improve the company's financial performance; even the tendency of companies 
to carelessly comply with the provisions of the rules regarding the existence of 
independent directors will bring a burden to the company so that it has an impact on 
decreasing the value of the company.   
The results of this study have a theoretical implication that the existence of women 
who are expected to be able to improve company performance is not proven; even 
investors perceive it as a negative thing. Theoretically, the size of the board of directors 
will also increase the financial burden, causing financial performance not to be better. 
The existence of an independent commissioner, which theoretically would increase 
supervision, was found to be the opposite. This result has practical implications that 
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the selection of women and independent directors is expected to be done openly so that 
investors know the capabilities of these women directors and independent directors. 
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